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resent an interest in the corporation, and their use enables the corporation to
raise money for its business. The former of these functions-the rights, powers,
privileges, and liabilities of an owner of some interest in the corporation-per-
haps better belongs to the field of business associations, the latter to the field
of credit. In the suggested course on Credit, then, stocks and bonds would be
considered with reference to their legal advantages and disadvantages as credit
instruments as compared with bills, notes, and checks, particularly from the
holder's point of view..
It has already been indicated that the present volume is up-to-date, and is
very- well suited for the customary presentation of the course in Bills and Notes.
To what extent could it be used to furnish material for such a course as that
which is here briefly outlined? So far as arrangement is concerned, it seems
quite suitable. Whatever may be the peculiar characteristics of a bill or a note
as compared with other instruments used for a similar purpose, the best way to
approach the subject seems to be through an understanding first of all of the dis-
tinctive form of the negotiable instrument and of the methods used in transferring
it to another. Later in the course, in considering the holder in due course, the
rights, powers, and privileges of a holder of other instruments might well be
discussed. For such a discussion, no material is here provided. Finally, the
liabilities of the different parties to the instrument might be compared briefly
with those of parties to the other credit instruments on the basis of the more
extended discussion of their functions in the other law school courses mentioned.
Although such a credit course as that suggested involves no very great addi-
tion of material to that in the present casebook, it involves a considerable
change in point of view, that is, in the attempt to give the student a new and
perhaps more useful focus for his work in this field.
Although the usefulness of any casebook depends upon its adaptability to the
method of attack upon the subject which the teacher prefers, the present volume
provides a good arrangement of material for either of the approaches to Bills and
Notes which have been undertaken or suggested. Business men are evolving
new and more complex credit devices for the exigencies arising in the pur-
chase and sale of the newer commodities; cases regarding these will doubtless
concern the courts in the future. Doubtless casebooks will some day appear,
based on a functional approach to the credit field, with full collections of cases
on the various topics which should be related therein. But at least until that
day, the present casebook will, it is believed, prove very satisfactory, as a sound
selection of cases covering the groundwork of the field of Bills and Notes.
RoSwELL MAGILL
University of Chicago Law School
Democracy's International Law. By Jackson H. Ralston. Washington, John
Byrne & Company, 1922. pp. 165.
This is essentially a book of protest against what is called international law,
which the author finds to be largely the embodiment of immorality and anti-
social practices akin to anarchy. The author is no tyro in the field of knowl-
edge which he so scathingly criticizes. With a respected professional connec-
tion with international law, as American Agent in the well-known Pious Fund
Case, as the Umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission and
the author of some of its most learned awards, as a practitioner of many years
standing, his views cannot be dismissed as the utterances of the impractical and
misinformed reformer. His attack is directed against the irresponsible State,
which he finds the subject of international law, and the so-called legalization
of what he regards as the lawlessness of its acts of aggression. He points out
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that what is called robbery and murder in all systems of private law is seemingly
ennobled as the fulfillment of national aspirations when undertaken by a group
sufficiently large to be called a nation. His protest is aimed against a system
which could legalize such practices and dignify results flowing from them by
the name of law. In his view all the so-called laws of war, which is the nat-
ural culmination of the international state of unrestrained irresponsibility, are
merely lawless practices which it is blasphemy to call law. He finds "true inter-
national law" in those rules of right living which should govern nations no less
than individuals and demands of the votaries of international law a ministra-
tion of these principles and rules. He finds, for example, in the division of
China into spheres of influence among the larger Powers a violation of a "natural
international law of nations," the punishment for which is "absolutely certain."
He manifests his lawyer's respect for sanctions by essaying to show that vio-
lations of these "fundamental" laws-which we would characterize as rules of
morality-meet just retribution, eventually if not at once, and he cites the ulti-
mate destruction of great empires. He attacks the conception of "vital inter-
ests," independence and national honor as deceptive excuses for the irresponsible
State to exert its uncontrolled will upon less fortunate or weaker nations. He
points out the futility of international courts as an agency for peace, because
the underlying principles which they accept as law are themselves the negation
of law. He says, for example, that the following "vicious propositions" would
today "be accepted by a court":
"A state is a non-moral creation, only to be held responsible to others for its
actions by its own consent.
"A state possesses such a right of sovereignty as enables it by force if it can
to impose its will on other states without being judicially accused of wrong for
so doing.
"A state must judge for itself what affects its own honor, vital interests or
independence.
"A state, after a successful war, has a right to impose its will upon the
vanquished.
"A state, provided it has sufficient power, may possess interests within the
jurisdiction of another state and dictate the management of its affairs.
"A state may acquire from an alien conqueror complete jurisdiction over a
vanquished people, violence creating title."
Much as we might be disposed to agree with the criticism of a system which
necessarily invites war as the ultina ratio and then legalizes its consequences,
it is not believed that international law is the proper focus of the criticism.
Law is a science which merely follows the facts, historical, social, and economic,
and records that which society and societal agents accept and enforce as binding.
Much of this, even in municipal law, is essentially immoral, as for example that
the State can do no legal wrong and cannot be sued. Yet so long as societal agents
enforce that rule, it must be regarded as law. Mr. Ralston's objection is more
properly directed against an international political and economic system which
embodies so many practices and results that are in domestic affairs regarded as
illegal, immoral, or anarchic, but which legally are still privileged internationally;
yet even temporary peace seems preferable to permanent var, and for this
reason international law has found it necessary to give legal effect to the prac-
tical consequences of facts. It is quite true that a lack of international organ-
ization, with certain mores of immorality, has permitted nations to be their
own plaintiffs, judges and sheriffs, with the result that jungle law is perpetuated.
The victory of law over violence has been slow even in municipal law. But, in
so far as belligerent relations are concerned, the cure lies in the direction of a
change of the mores by education of public opinion to the realization that the
present system of international unfair competition not only leads inevitably to
war but that with growing effectiveness of the means of destruction the very
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existence of the human race is at stake. Thoughtful men realize that it is now
a race between education in the interest of general self-preservation, and gen-
eral destruction. But Mr. Ralston's criticisms of law are reminiscent of the
contests waged by the school of "natural law" which also had a theory that only
that which was "fundamentally right" was law. This, it is believed, confuses
ethics with law. Moreover, while alleged violations of this "fundamental" law
can frequently be shown to be disastrous to the violator, it by no means follows
that unjust aggression always meets its just reward. On the contrary, a glance
at the empires of the world might show that aggression seems to pay; and even if
in due time these empires may collapse from internal or external causes it would
not be provable that this is a direct consequence of their aggression. It seems
that Mr. Ralston makes too great a demand on international law when he requires
that it regard as illegal those acts and their consequences which do not respond
to the highest conceptions of ethics and morality. International law might thus
become even weaker than it is
' and it would not thereby make the contribution
to decency which Mr. Ralston demands of it. The remedy lies in educating
public opinion to an appreciation of the fact that both morality and self-interest
demand a different conception of international relations, which international
law would then gladly record and apply. The reading of this .hook in picturing
the existing order in international relations will do much to afford that very
education which is so much needed.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD
Yale University Law School
Common Law Marriage and Its Development itn the United States. By, Otto E.
Koegel. Washington, John Byrne & Co., 1922. pp. 179.
In the pages of this book the author makes no contribution to the solution of
the problems presented by the existence of common-law marriages in the United
States nor does he present any material which is at all new or original. The
entire volume is summed up in one paragraph which extends from the bottom
of page eight to the middle of page ten. Here the author indicates (i) that com-
mon-law marriages have not been valid in England since I753; (2) that such mar-
riages were valid in England before that date; (3) that such marriages were
invalid at common law for possessory purposes; (4) that such marriages were
invalid in some of the American Colonies and contrary to legislation and policy
of all colonies; (5) that the earlier decisions in the United States are against
the validity of common-law marriages, but that the later ones, following some
dicta of Chancellor Kent's in i8o9, hold that such marriages are valid, and (6)
that the decisions in this country on the subject are poorly considered and are
at variance with each other, and that (7) such marriages are opposed by the
American Bar Association, the Commission on Uniform State Laws and "all
modern authorities on Sociology, Marriage, and kindred subjects." The one
hundred and sixty pages which follow add nothing to this paragraph. They
simply expand the obvious by quotations from cases and textbooks which are
well known. Fully half the book is made up of quotations. A great portion
of the rest of the text consists of sentences introducing or connecting these
quotations.
ALBERT Ln n t
New Haven, Connecticut
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